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Appellant, Michael Anthony Archuleta, through counsel, respectfully asks this 
Court to accept Appellee's (the State's) Letter in Lieu of Appellee Brief as a waiver of 
any arguments against the substance of the issues raised in his Opening Brief. For the 
reasons below, this Court should accept the assertions in Mr. Archuleta's Opening Brief 
and grant relief. In the alternative, should this Court order the State to respond to Mr. 
Archuleta's Opening Brief, he respectfully asks the Court to set a revised briefing 
schedule ordering the State to file an Answering Brief and to permit Mr. Archuleta 
adequate time to reply. 
BACKGROUND 
The United States District Court for the District of Utah found that Mr. Archuleta 
had raised "a potentially meritorious and not plainly meritless" issue that he is 
intellectually disabled. (ECF 107, Order Granting Motion to Stay at 12, Archuleta v. 
Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630 (D. Utah Nov. 11, 2014).) It found that Mr. Archuleta had 
"made the preliminary showing that he is intellectually disabled and is entitled to an 
adjudication of his condition." (ECF 107, Order Granting Motion to Stay at 18, Archuleta 
v. Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630 (D. Utah Nov. 11, 2014).) And, while the federal court, in 
the interest of comity, ultimately decided to permit Utah's state courts to adjudicate the 
merits of his intellectual disability, it noted that "there were questions about his 
intellectual ability and adaptive functioning from an early age that were not fully 
addressed during trial, or even during the later evidentiary hearing, in an Atkins 
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context."1 (ECF 107, Order Granting Motion to Stay at 12, Archuleta v. Crowther, No. 
2:07-CV-630 (D. Utah Nov. 11, 2014).) 
The federal court also found that Mr. Archuleta had presented "good cause" for 
failing to raise his intellectual disability claim in state court-"the ineffective assistance 
of post-conviction counsel." As the court noted, the good cause standard in this context is 
a "very high bar." (ECF 107, Order Granting Motion to Stay at 10, Archuleta v. 
Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630 (D. Utah Nov. 11, 2014).) It explained that, "Given 
everything else in the record before the court, the more reasonable conclusion is that 
[post-conviction counsel,] Mr. Brass, by his own admission, was not competent to handle 
capital habeas appeals alone, which is what he was doing in Mr. Archuleta's case, and 
that, as discussed more below, he did not have the time or resources" to raise Mr. 
Archuleta's intellectual disability claim. What is more, "The state made Mr. Brass's job 
difficult. It attacked him personally through litigation sanctions that were ultimately 
found to be baseless, and it refused to properly fund his defense of Mr. Archuleta. By its 
actions, the state created a conflict of interest between Mr. Brass and his client that made 
it impossible for him to completely and reasonably represent Mr. Archuleta." (ECF 107, 
Order Granting Motion to Stay at 11 n.13, Archuleta v. Crowther, No. 2:07-CV-630 (D. 
Utah Nov. 11, 2014).) Thus, the federal district court stayed Mr. Archuleta's federal 
habeas proceedings and permitted him to return to state court with the help of his federal 
1 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) ( executing intellectually disabled persons 
violates the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
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habeas counsel. In his resulting state post-conviction proceedings, federal habeas counsel 
raised both Mr. Archuleta's intellectual disability and additional claims ("non-Atkins" 
claims) which his ineffective trial and post-conviction counsel had failed to ever raise 
before the state courts. 
At that point, Appellee (the State) sought to avoid addressing any of the issues that 
are the subject of this appeal. Citing its own "workload" and the "complexity of the 
issues," the State asked to delay litigating any of the non-Atkins claims. (See Order 
Granting Motion for Extension to Respond to Petition and for Partial Stay of Petition, 
Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 (Fourth Judicial Dist. Feb. 18, 2015).) It asked, over 
Mr. Archuleta's objection, to be excused from responding to the merits of these claims. 
(Motion to Bifurcate and Stay Time to Respond on the Merits, Archuleta v. State, No. 
140700047 (Fourth Judicial Dist. May 16, 2016); see also Opposition to Motion to 
Bifurcate and Stay Time to Respond on the Merits, Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 
(Fourth Judicial Dist. May 31, 2016).) The State addressed only procedural issues in its 
summary judgment requests and has never addressed the merits of the non-Atkins issues. 
The State also specifically asked the state post-conviction court to separate the 
non-Atkins claims from Mr. Archuleta's Atkins claim on appeal. (Motion to Certify Atkins 
Decision as Final and Appealable, Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 (Fourth Judicial 
Dist. Feb. 3, 2016).) Mr. Archuleta opposed such an action, explaining "the effect will be 
to burden the Utah Supreme Court with two appeals where there should only be one." 
(Response in Opposition to Respondent's Motion to Certify Atkins Decision as Final and 
3 
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Appealable at 2, Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 (Fourth Judicial Dist. Feb. 17, 
2016).) The court granted the certification over his objection. 
In fact, the State argued and the post-conviction court accepted that "there is no 
factual overlap between the Atkins claim and the remaining claims." (See Ruling and 
Order on Respondent's Motion to Certify Atkins Decision as Final and Appealable at 4, 
Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 (Fourth Judicial Dist. Apr. 12, 2016).) The court 
found (again, over Mr. Archuleta's objection) that "the Atkins order is completely 
separate from the remaining twelve claims and will not require the appellate court to 
address similar issues in a piecemeal fashion." (Ruling and Order on Respondent's 
Motion to Certify Atkins Decision as Final and Appealable at 4, Archuleta v. State, No. 
140700047 (Fourth Judicial Dist. Apr. 12, 2016).) 
The result of the above was twofold. First, the State has entirely avoided ever 
addressing any of the merits of Mr. Archuleta's non-Atkins claims. Second, it has 
succeeded in causing this Court to proceed with two separate appeals from one post-
conviction case. 
Now, however, the State has changed course. It asserts that its arguments in the 
Atkins appeal (Case Number 20160419), "apply with equal force to the claims at issue in 
this matter" and deigns to write the Court that "this case does not merit the State's 
resources to prepare a responsive brief." (Letter in Lieu of Appellee Brief ("Appellee 
Letter") at 1, Archuleta v. State, No. 20160992 (Utah June 9, 2017).) 
4 
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This Court should hold the State to the consequences of its decisions and accept its 
letter as a waiver of the arguments made in Mr. Archuleta's Opening Brief. 
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES 
In this Court, an appellee's brief must generally include the same elements as an 
appellant's brief, and must "contain the contentions and reasons of the appellee with 
respect to the issues presented in the opposing brief." See generally Brown v. Glover, 
2000 UT 89, iJ 22, 16 P.3d 540, 545 (citing Utah R. App. P. 24 (a)(9), (b)). This Court 
does not "assume a party's burden of argument and research, ... particularly when, as 
here, a party's lack of clarity and supporting argumentation leaves the opposing party 
without a fair opportunity to respond." See Cheek v. Clay Bulloch Constr., Inc., 2016 UT 
App 227, il 31, 387 P.3d 611, 617-18. This Court may refuse, sua sponte, to consider 
inadequately briefed arguments. See State v. Hawkins, 2016 UT App 9, il 60, 366 P.3d 
884, 897 ( quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, iJ 22, l 28 P .3d l l 79). 
Mr. Archuleta filed with this Court a 56-page Opening Brief, complete with 
authority and record citations, outlining his claims for relief in this case.2 (Opening Brief, 
Archuleta v. State, No. 20160992 (Utah May 5, 2017).) The State replied with a one-and-
a-half page letter, insisting that "The outcome of this case is not in doubt" and that it 
2 These claims include the post-conviction court's improper denial of his non-Atkins 
claims. 
5 
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"does not merit the State's resources to prepare a responsive brief." (Appellee Letter at 1-
2.) 
The State has thus failed to present any arguments opposing the substance of Mr. 
Archuleta's Opening Brief. This Court should consider any such opposition waived. 
First, the State points out that it is "accept[ing] this Court's invitation to 'rest on 
the pleadings' it has already filed." (Appellee Letter at 2.) The pleading the State filed-
its December 2016 "Motion for Summary Disposition" 3-however, did not at all address 
the substance of the legal and factual issues raised in Mr. Archuleta's Opening Brief. The 
State made various incorrect assertions regarding the timing of the filing of his claims, 
then asserted in a conclusory manner that the post-conviction court's application of time 
and procedural bars to Mr. Archuleta's non-Atkins claims was "clearly correct." (Motion 
for Summary Disposition at 6, Archuleta v. State, No. 20160992 (Utah Dec. 28, 2016).) 
Nothing in the State's amorphous arguments about appellate review addresses any of the 
specific arguments raised in Mr. Archuleta' s Opening Brief. The State has not only failed 
to address Mr. Archuleta's specific assertions about the application of the Post-
Conviction Remedies Act, but it has failed to even mention the merits of the underlying 
claims. No reading of the State's Motion for Summary Disposition can be said to address 
the detailed allegations in Mr. Archuleta' s Opening Brief. 
3 Mr. Archuleta outlined the reasons summary disposition is entirely inappropriate in his 
Response to Motion for Summary Disposition, filed January 9, 2017. He respectfully 
incorporates those reasons herein. 
6 
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Second, the State seems to suggest that "its brief in [Mr.] Archuleta's other appeal, 
case number 20160419 ... set forth the State's arguments for applying time and 
procedural bars to all of [Mr.] Archuleta's claims." (Appellee Letter at 1.) As explained 
above, however, the State was the party which asked, over Mr. Archuleta's objection, to 
pursue separate appeals. In fact, in ruling on the motion to separately certify the Atkins 
issue for appeal, the post-conviction court relied upon the State's assertions that "the 
remaining [non-Atkins] claims are independent and freestanding." (See Motion to Certify 
Atkins Decision as Final and Appealable at 6, Archuleta v. State, No. 140700047 (Fourth 
Judicial Dist. Feb. 3, 2016) (citing Powell v. Cannon, 2008 UT 19, 179 P.3d 799 
( conditioning appealability on the degree of "factual overlap" between resolved and 
unresolved claims)).) Thus, there is no basis for this Court to consider arguments the State 
has made outside the proceedings in the instant case number. 
The State first elected to "conserve resources" by splitting for separate appeals 
these meritorious non-Atkins claims from the claim regarding Mr. Archuleta's intellectual 
disability. Now that the time has come to respond to their merits, it has changed course 
and insists that it would waste its resources to respond separately. At best, the State 
should be judicially estopped from avoiding its briefing responsibilities in this way. See 
generally Hill v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 829 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(principles of judicial estoppel seek to "prevent a party in legal proceedings from taking a 
position, pursuing that position to fruition, and later returning to attack the validity of the 
prior position or the outcome flowing from it"). At worst, this reveals, among other 
7 
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things, the State's ultimate goal: to protect itself from engaging these serious issues. The 
State has, at every tum, attempted to tum the courts' focus away from addressing the 
merits of the issues in this case. Either way, the time for games must come to an end. The 
State asked to respond to Mr. Archuleta' s claims in a separately certified appeal. It has 
failed to do so. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons above, Mr. Archuleta respectfully asks this Court to accept the 
State's Letter in Lieu of Appellee Brief as a waiver of any arguments against the 
substance of the issues raised in his Opening Brief. This Court should accept the 
assertions in Mr. Archuleta's Opening Brief and grant the relief requested therein. 
In the alternative, should this Court order the State to respond to Mr. Archuleta's 
Opening Brief, he respectfully asks the Court to set a revised briefing schedule ordering 
the State to file an Answering Brief and to permit Mr. Archuleta adequate time to reply. 
Respectfully submitted this 5th day of July, 2017. 
Jon M. Sands 
Federal Public Defender 
Leticia Marquez 
Charlotte G. Merrill 
Assistant Federal Public Defenders 
By: s/ Charlotte G. Merrill 
Charlotte G. Merrill 
Counsel for Petitioner/ Appellant 
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